A Mobile Ad hoc Network (MANET) is a network that consists of mobile nodes and is autonomously managed without infrastructure base stations such as access points. MANETs have started being used as part of safety critical applications. A Vehicular Ad hoc Network (VANET) used in automated driving systems is such an example. In such applications, defects in the network protocol may cause serious social problems. Model checking, a state search-based verification technique, has proven to be effective in finding faults in complex system designs, such as communication protocols. However it is challenging to apply this technique to MANET protocols, because a MANET can have a number of different network topologies, thus resulting in the state explosion problem very easily. In this paper we propose a modeling technique to mitigate this problem using the AODV protocol as a running example. MANET protocols, such as AODV, typically enforce a source node that wishes to establish a route to the destination to retry the route establishing process some fixed number of times in face of failures. We show that to model check the protocol's behavior in these retries it suffices to consider only the last trial. The results of experiments using the SPIN model checker show that using the proposed technique significantly reduced the time and memory usage compared to standard full state exploration and allowed us to model check the protocol with up to five nodes.
Introduction
A Mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a network that consists of mobile nodes. A collection of these mobile nodes autonomously manages the MANET without infrastructure base stations, such as access points. These nodes can move and go away from the communication range of each other; thus the topology of a MANET varies dynamically. Examples of MANETs include vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). In a VANET an automobile serves as a node. Automated driving systems are an example of an application of VANETs. As MANETs serve as social infrastructures, their failures can cause serious social problems. Aiming to prevent failures resulted from design defects of MANET communication protocols, we focus on the verification of these protocols.
Many MANET routing protocols have been developed so far [7] [4] . These protocols are classified into three groups according to the type of route maintenance. The first group consists of reactive protocols including AODV [33] and DSR [26] . In a reactive protocol a communication route is established on demand: The source node, which wishes to send data to another node, tries to establish a route to the destination node before the data transfer. After the source node finishes sending the data, the route will be discarded. The second group consists of proactive protocols, such as OLSR [11] and TBRPF [32] , where all nodes keep tracks of routes to other nodes in the network, while the third groups consists of hybrid protocols which have features of both groups. In this work we limit our interest to reactive protocols, since the protocols of this type have received most attention among the three groups.
Model checking is a common method for verifying communication protocols. Mature model checking tools, such as SPIN [25] and UPPAAL [29] , are readily available. These tools can mechanically verify whether a given property holds or not by searching all possible states of a target protocol design. This comprehensiveness is especially useful in the verification of MANET protocols, because the topology of a MANET can be various and dynamically change. Unlike model checking, simulations or real device experiments can check only a fraction of the state space.
However, it is challenging applying model checking to MANET protocols as it results in state space explosion very easily. In this paper we propose a modeling technique to mitigate this problem in the model checking of reactive MANET protocols. A reactive protocol enforces a source node which wishes to establish a route to the destination to retry the route establishing process some fixed number of times in face of failures. We show that to model check the protocol's behavior in these retries it suffices to consider only the last trial. This is based on the observations that when initiating the last trial, the state of a node is of either one of a few possible patterns and that these patterns subsume those that occur at the previous trials. To show the usefulness of the proposed technique, we will later show the results of experiments using the SPIN model checker [25] .
In this paper we explain our technique for a particular MANET protocol, namely, the AODV protocol, which is one of the best known reactive protocols. Although applying the technique to other protocols is left as future work, we believe that this is not difficult because AODV shares substantial traits with other reactive protocols.
Routing Protocol AODV
In this section, we explain AODV on which we focus in this paper. Nodes in a MANET behave as follows. When a source node communicates with another node, the source node needs to establish a route to that destination node. To this end, the source node broadcasts a request packet rreq. A node that received rreq compares its own ID with the destination ID specified by rreq. If the node's ID is the destination ID, then the node will send a reply packet rrep to the source node. If not, the node forwards rreq to its neighbor nodes by broadcasting it.
Packets
In addition to data packets, AODV uses three types of control packets, namely rreq, rrep, and rrer. Here we explain rreq and rrep because they are used in establishing a route from a source node to its destination node. The third kind of packets, rerr, is used to, for example, notify that an already established route has become unavailable. As the focus of our paper is on verification of route establishing processes, we do not consider rerr hereafter.
rreq: Route REQuest packet
An rreq is a six-tuple rreq = (src, sndr, dest, seq S , seq D , hops) where:
src : The ID of the source node that is establishing a route to the destination node.
sndr : The ID of the sender node that has sent the packet.
dest : The ID of the destination.
seq S : The sequence number. hops : The number of hops from src.
A source node establishes a route to its destination node as follows. First, the source node broadcasts an rreq to its neighbors. When a node that is not the destination receives the rreq, the node will forward it by broadcast or simply discard it, depending on its routing table. In the case of forwarding, the node modifies rreq by replacing the sndr element with its own ID and then forwards the new packet.
rrep: Route REPly packet
When the destination node receives rreq, it will generate a reply packet rrep then send rrep to one neighbor by unicast. An rrep travels back from the destination node to the source node on the route. An rrep is a six-tuple rrep = (dest, seq D , src, sndr, next, hops). rrep is a reply packet for rreq. These elements of an rreq are determined as follows:
dest : The ID of the destination node (same as rreq.src)
The sequence number (same as rreq.seq S ) src : The ID of the source node (same as rreq.dest) sndr : The ID of the sender node next : The ID of the node that should receive this packet hops : The number of hops from src
Routing Table
A node has one routing table which holds entries. Each entry indicates a pair of a destination node and the next hop node to which the node should forward a packet for the destination node. When a node receives a packet, the node will look for an entry that matches the destination node of the received packet. If such an entry is found, then the node will forward the packet to the next hop node specified by the entry. An entry e is a four-tuple e = (dest, next, seq, hops) where dest : The ID of the destination node.
next : The ID of the next hop node to which a packet to dest is forwarded.
seq : The sequence number.
hops : The hop count from dest.
Upon receiving a packet, the node performs either one of the three operations: adding an entry, updating an entry, or discarding the packet. Which of these operations is performed depends on the entries of the routing table and the incoming packet, as described below. We let rt denote the routing table and assume that no two entries have the same dest, i.e., ∀e 1 , e 2 ( = e 1 ) ∈ rt : e 1 .dest = e 2 .dest. The sequence number seq is used to determine whether or not a received packet is newer than its corresponding entry. If the packet's sequence number is greater than that of the entry, then the entry is updated because the packet is newer. In the rest of this subsection, we describe in detail when a new entry is added and when an existing entry is updated. We denote by id the ID of the node that has received the packet. In practice, an IP address is used as an ID; but for simplicity of presentation, we often use small integers as concrete examples of IDs. The hops entry represents the hop count from the destination node, that is, the number of hops needed to reach the destination.
Adding an entry
The node that received a packet adds a new entry to the routing table if the following condition holds. If the packet received is an rreq, then the condition is:
The node generates a new entry e, which is defined by (3), and adds it to its own routing table when either eq. (1) 
If the packet received is an rrep, then the condition is:
The node generates a new entry e, which is defined by (5) , and adds e to its own routing table when eq. (4) 
Updating an entry
Upon receiving a packet rreq or rrep, the node updates an entry e such that e.dest = rreq.src or e.dest = rrep.src if the following condition holds. For an rreq:
∃e ∈ rt : (e.dest = rreq.src ∧ e.seq < rreq.seq S ) ∧ rreq.dest = id (6) or ∃e ∈ rt : (e.dest = rreq.src ∧ e.seq < rreq.seq S ) ∧ rreq.dest = id
The node updates e as defined by (8) when either eq.(6) or eq. (7) is true. Eq.(6) applies when the node is a forwarding node, whereas eq. (7) holds when the node is the destination node. e = (dest, next, seq, hops) = (dest, rreq.sndr, rreq.sep S , rreq.hops)
For an rrep:
When eq. (9) is true, the node updates e2 as follows. 
Program Description
The program in Fig. 1 represents the behavior of the destination node and forwarding node in AODV. The program consists of a set of objects and a set of actions. An action may have a guard, in which case it is described as guard → statement. The guard is a boolean expression over the states of objects in the program. When the guard is true, the statement can be executed. If some actions are described as
then, one of the actions whose guard is true is executed. If two or more guards become true at the same time, one action is nondeterministically selected to execute.
The objects in the program in Fig. 1 include:
• RT [k]: the routing table of node k(∈ X), which is a set of entries, i.e., RT [k] = {e1, e2, . . .}.
• pkt: the packet received through incoming channel
X is a set of node IDs in the network. CH[k] is the incoming channel for node k(∈ X). CH [k] ?pkt in line 9 represents an action that receives a packet and stores it in pkt when a packet exists in CH [k] . The type of pkt is either rreq or rrep. The functions used in the program are described below.
• exist(id)(id ∈ X): returns an entry e such that e.dest=id from RT [k]. Returns null if no such entry exists.
• insert(pkt): creates an entry e from pkt and adds it to RT [k] . If the packet type of pkt is rreq, this function creates an entry e as specified by (3). If pkt is rrep, this function creates e as specified by (5).
• update(e,pkt): updates e based on pkt. If pkt is rreq, e is updated as defined as (8) . If pkt is rrep, e is updated as defined as (10).
• broadcast(pkt): replaces pkt.sndr with k and puts pkt into CH[l] for all l ∈ X where X is the set of neighbor nodes that can communicate with k at the time of the broadcast. X can be any subset of X\{k}, i.e., X ⊆ X\{k}.
• unicast(e,pkt): replaces pkt.sndr with k and pkt.next with e.next and puts pkt into CH[e.next].
• reply(pkt): obtains an entry e by executing exist(pkt.src), generates rrep = (dest, seq D , src, sndr, next, hops) = (e.dest, e.seq, k, k, e.next, 0) and puts it into CH[e.next].
As shown in Fig. 1 , the program consists of a big while loop which is executed in response to the reception of a new packet. Table 1 explains each action in the while loop. Eq. (1) When node k is not the destination node of the received packet pkt, node k adds an entry e generated from the received pkt by using insert(pkt) and broadcasts the new packet. 12
Eq.(6) When node k is not the destination node of the received packet pkt, node k updates the entry e1 by using updates(e1,pkt) and broadcasts the new packet. 13 Eq.(2) When node k is the destination node of the received packet pkt, node k adds an entry e generated from the received packet pkt by using insert(pkt) and generates a new rrep and sends it by using reply(pkt). 14 Eq. (7) When node k is the destination node of the received packet pkt, node k updates the entry e2 and sends a packet by unicast(pkt). 15
Eq. (4) When the type of the received packet is rrep, node k generates an entry e and adds it by using insert(pkt). Then, node k sends it by unicast(pkt). 16 Eq. (9) When the type of the received packet is rrep, node k updates the entry e2 by using update(e2,pkt). Then node k sends rrep by unicast(pkt). 17 none Node k discards the received packet.
Illustrative Example
We illustrate the route establishment process in AODV using (a)- (1): S broadcasts rreq = (S, S, D, 0, 0, 0), then both node 1 and node 2 receive it. As the routing tables of node 1 and node 2 were empty, a new entry is added to these routing tables. {e 1 (req,S) } in the third column is a symbolic representation of the routing table which will be explained in Section 4. 
Routing tables
RT s (dest, next, seq, hops) RT [S] ∅ RT [1] (S, S, 0, 1) e 1 (req,S) RT [2] (S, S, 0, 1) e 1 (req,S) RT [D] ∅
(a)-(3): Node 2 behaves similarly to node 1. Node 2 broadcasts rreq = (S, 2, D, 0, 0, 1) to forward it. Although node 1 receives the rreq from node 2, node 1 discards it.
from entry e = (S, 1, 0, 2) and sends it by unicast to node 1 which is the next node of e. Receiving the rrep from D, node 1 adds entry (D, D, 0, 1) to
(b)- (5): Node 1 sends an rrep = (S, 0, D, 1, 2) to node S which is the next node of entry (S, S, 0, 1). Node S adds an entry for D after receiving the rrep from node 1. As a result, the route between S and D has established. 
SPIN Model
In this section, we show how to represent a MANET protocol using Promela, the input language of the SPIN model checker. Promela has a C-like language syntax. In a Promela program, the system under verification is modeled as a set of concurrent processes. We model a MANET with n nodes using n processes. A process p id has id which is a positive integer value. BUFF indicates a buffer size of the channel. We set the value of BUFF to one. The channel is used to store an incoming message sent by a neighbor node. 
Channel

Routing
Broadcasting and Mobility
We have to represent node movements and broadcast of packets. Nodes that receive packets broadcasted by a sender node must be in sender node's communication range. Fig. 3 shows a Promela code that represents broadcasting and node movements simultaneously. Here the number of nodes in the MANET is assumed to be five. This code uses the nondeterministic do construct of Promela to nondeterministically select some receiver nodes. The message broadcasted is replicated and put into the incoming channels of these receiver nodes.
This receiver node selection is performed as follows. Array sent[], where all entries are initially 0, is used to represent the receiver nodes already selected. Line 1 is used to prevent from choosing the sender process p id as a receiver node. Line 4 to line 9 are used to nondeterministically select a node (lines 4 to 8) or decide not to select a node (line 9). Line 12 to line 19 are used to send a packet. If the channel of a receiver node, denoted as p index , is full, then the older packet in the channel is removed and then the new broadcasted packet is put into the channel. In this case p index will never receive the discarded old packet.
Parameter AROUND specifies the maximum number of receiver nodes selected when a message is broadcasted. A small AROUND value restricts possible topologies and possible dynamic topology changes but reduces the state space and in turn time and memory used by model checking.
In more detail, by enforcing the process to nondeterministically select channels of up to AROUND receiver nodes, the Promela code in Fig. 3 represents all possible topologies with every node having at most AROUND neighbors. When AROUND is two, the channels are selected at most twice and thus the possible combinations of channels that process p 1 can select become as listed in Table 2 . For example, if line 5 and line 6 are nondeterministically selected to execute during the two iterations of the do-loop, then the selected channels will be CH[2] and CH[3] (cs1 in Table 2 ), in which case p 1 will put a broadcast packet into both CH[2] and CH [3] . This models the case where there are two neighbor nodes (node 2 and node 3) in the propagation range of p 1 . Combinations cs4, cs7, cs9 and cs10 occur if line 9 is executed in one iteration and one of line 5 to line 8 is executed in the other iteration. These combinations mean that the number of neighbor nodes of p 1 is one. There can be no neighbor node around p 1 and this will happen when line 9 is selected twice (cs11). Note that all these possibilities summarized in Table 2 are examined when model checking is performed and that dynamic changes in topology due to node mobility can be represented as long as the number of neighbor nodes does not exceed AROUND.
Proposed Technique
We consider the problem of model checking the whole process of route establishment initiated by a single source node. In this section we present our technique to reduce the state space of the model checking problem. In AODV, in face of failures the source node repeats the route establishment process at most three times. As we will show later, the whole series of these trials induces a very large state space and makes the amount of memory and time required prohibitively large. In this section we propose a modeling technique to mitigate state space explosion by reducing the state space. Our proposed method focuses on the third trial of route establishment. Let rreq n S represents the rreq that the source node broadcasts at the nth round. Fig. 4 schematically shows how states in the state space are reached as the trials proceed. In  Fig. 4 , S n (n = 1, 2, 3) is a set of states at the beginning of the n-th trial. In the following of the section, we show S 3 subsumes S 1 and S 2 and therefore model checking of the third trial, starting with S 3 , can detects that can manifest themselves during the third trial as well as those for the first and second trials.
We make the following assumptions.
• No entry in a routing table is discarded because of time out.
• There is exactly one source-destination pair that attempts route establishment. • Routing tables initially has no entries relevant to the route establishment.
We show that state that can occur in the first and second trials also occur in the third trial. Our argument is as follows. In any round, a node executes an action only when a packet is received (line 9 of Fig. 1 ). The number of the current trial, which is reflected in the seq field of the packet, may enable the actions of lines 12, 14, and 16 if the trail number is greater than that of the corresponding table entry (e1.seq < pkt.seq in line 12, for example). On the other hand, if the trail number is smaller than or equal to that of the entry, then it never disables any actions. This means that packets with a lower trail number than the current trail number cannot produce new states of the routing table if the current entries of the routing table are the same. In the following subsections, we show that the set of initial states of the third trial S 3 contains the states in S 1 and S 2 ; thus checking the third trial suffices to produce possible states.
Classification of the State of a Routing Table
As we assume that there is a single pair of source and destination nodes, there are at most two entries that are relevant to the model checking problem, more specifically, the entries whose dest (the first element) is the source or destination node. Table 3 shows symbolic representation of these two entries. Note that an entry is generated or updated in response to receipt of a packet. The left column shows the packets that yield the entries on the right column. Here n represents the trial number whose range is n ∈ {1, 2, 3}. i and j represent the sender node.
In the rest of the section we show that the entry set of a routing table at states in S 3 can be classified into six patterns as shown below. 
Note that these patterns subsume those that can occur at the beginning of the first or second trials. For example, the initial state of a routing table in the second trial is of either of rt1, rt2 or rt3.
Below we elaborate a more detailed argument about how these patterns occur. First we consider forwarding nodes. Table 4 shows how the routing table of a forwarding node changes during the first round. The column rts shows the entries in the routing table at the beginning of the first round. Initially, there is no entry in the routing table (denoted by rt1). The column packet represents the received packet during the first round. When the node receives rreq 1 i , the action at line 11 in Fig. 1 is executed. As a result, the routing table becomes rt2. After being updated to rt2, if the node receives rrep 1 j , then the action at line 15 in Fig. 1 is executed, resulting in rt3 of the routing table. Table 5 shows how the routing table is updated in the second round. At the beginning of the second round, the state of the routing stable is either of rt1, rt2 or rt3, as indicated in the rts column of Table 5 . Note that rt1 occurs when no packet is received in the first round. In the second round, if the node receives rreq 2 i , then rt1, rt2 and rt3 become rt4, rt4 and rt5, respectively. When the node receives rrep 2 j after having received rreq 2 i , rt4 and rt5 both transit to rt6. If the node receives no packet during the second round, its routing table stays the same, meaning that the state is either rt1, rt2 or rt3. Table 6 shows the updates in the third round. The column rts in Table 6 shows the possible six states at the beginning of the third round. Note that the set of these states subsumes the set of the initial states of the first round (Table 4) and that of the second round (Table 5) .
Similarly, we summarize the changes of the routing table of the destination node in Table 7 , Table 8 and Table 9 . As can be seen in these tables, the routing table of the destination node is either rt1, rt2 or rt4 at the beginning of the third round.
Effects of In-Transit Packets
Although the routing table at the beginning of the third trial is of either one of the six patterns as shown above, there can be in-transit packets, such as rreq j , and if a node receives such a packet, the state of the routing table can be changed. Here we show that the presence of these in-transit packets does not affect our argument that the state of a routing table is of either one of these six patterns. Table 10 summarizes the effects of receipt of an in-transit packet on the routing table. In this table the left column shows the classified type of the routing table before receiving the packet. The middle column shows received packets sent in the first or second trial. The right column shows the pattern of the routing tables after receiving the packet. As can be seen in the table, even if a node receives a packet sent in the previous trials, the routing table is still of one of the six patterns. Therefore we can ignore in-transit packets and can assume that the channels are empty when the third trial starts.
Generating SPIN Models with Different Initial States
To model check all different initial states of the third trial using the SPIN model checker, we create instances of a SPIN model each with a different initial state. As there is a total of six possible patterns for a routing table, there are 6 m initial states where m is the number of nodes in the MANET. This number can be reduced based on the following two observations. First, the routing table of the source node can be ignored since once having sent the rreq, the source node is not involved in route establishment until it receives the rrep. Second, although the details are omitted, it can be shown that the routing table of the destination node has only three possible patterns. As a result, the total number of SPIN model instances is 6 m−2 × 3. When m = 4, this number becomes 108.
Experimental Result
In this section we show the results of two experiments. The first experiment evaluates the effectiveness of the proposed modeling technique with respect to performance of model checking. The second experiment is intended to demonstrate the ability of detecting design faults.
Performance Evaluation
The purpose of this experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed technique with respect to model checking performance. In this experiment we considered MANETs consisting of four nodes and five nodes and assumed that each node has at most two neighbor nodes at any time instance. Of the four or five nodes, two particular nodes were designated as the source node and the destination node. The machine specifications and the model checking tool are as follows. For the four node network, as described in the previous section, we created 108 (6 2 × 3) SPIN models each with a different initial state (combination of patterns) of routing tables. For the five node network, we created 648 (6 3 × 3) SPIN models. The execution time is the summation of the execution time required for model checking all the instances. The size of the state space and the amount of memory used are also the summation for all the instances.
For comparison purposes, we also measured performance of full state space search, that is, model checking of the whole series of the three trials from the beginning. The results of the experiment are summarized in Tables 11, 12 , 13 and 14. We varied the number of nodes from two to four and each table shows the results for each of these four cases.
When the number of nodes was two or three, model checking was finished almost instantly for both approaches. Interestingly the full state space search yielded a smaller state space for the two node-case. This can be explained as follows. The full state space search does not explore the same state more than once. On the other hand, the proposed approach executes multiple instances of model checking and the same state may be visited in two or more runs.
When the number of nodes was three or four, the full state space search was not completed because available memory was exhausted. On the other hand, with our proposed technique, model checking was successfully completed for both all the 108 instances and all the 648 instances. Note that the number of states explored by the full state space search until memory exhaustion was much larger than that of states explored by all runs of the proposed approach. This and the results for fewer nodes show that reachable states very rapidly increase as the number of nodes grows and that the proposed approach can significantly lower the increase by achieving considerable state space reduction. Execution time, state space, and memory usage were all reduced significantly as shown in Tables 13 and 14 .
No defects were found in the experiments. This is unsurprising as AODV is time tested. Each of the SPIN models generated by the proposed technique can be executed in isolation, because these models are independent with each other. This is why the proposed techniques were successful in completing verification although the total time and memory usage was larger than the ordinary model checking case.
Loop Detection
It is known that an older version of AODV had a defect which causes loop generation. For example, in [6] , some scenarios where loop routes are generated were detected by applying model checking and theorem proving to a MANET with three-node linear topologies. (4) : Node 2 broadcasts rreq, then node 1 receives it. Afterwards, the entry of node 1 enforces it to send packets whose destination is S to node 2. Node 2 sends a packet whose destination is S to node 1, thus resulting in a loop.
Aiming to show that our technique can be useful in detecting a defect, we conducted an experiment where we attempted to detect loop. As it was known that this error occurs only when routing table entries are discarded, we extended our model such that a node may discard the entries because of time out. In order to detect a loop, we embedded C language code into the SPIN model written in Promela. By consulting the routing tables of the nodes, this code traverses a route from Figure 6 : Embedded C code for loop detection a given node to the source node. If the node appears on the way to the source node, then it can be concluded that the traced route forms a loop. Fig. 6 shows the embedded C code (lines [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] and an assertion (line 15) for detecting the existence of a loop. This code is executed by every process (i.e., node). PNode→ id is the ID of the node that executes the C code; thus id is initially set to the ID of the node (line 2). The keyword now is used to access Promela variables from C code. The variable loop is a flag in the Promela code to decide the existence of a loop and is initialized and set in the C code by setting now.loop to 0 (line 3) and 1 (line 9).
Route traverse is carried out as follows. First the routing table of node id is checked to see if there is an entry for S. The while loop (lines 4-13) is used for this purpose, where cnt, ranging from 0 to RT LENGTH −1, is used as the index for entries. The keyword now is used to access the routing table: the cnt-th entry can be read by accessing now.RT [id] .entries [cnt] . If there is an entry for destination S (line=5), then id is updated to the next node on the route (line 6). If the next node is S, then the traverse on the route to S finishes without encountering a loop, thus finishing loop detection by breaking the while loop (line 7). If the next node is PNode→ id, i.e., the node that initiates loop detection, then it turns out that a loop exists (line 9). If the above two cases do not apply, then route traversal continues by checking the route table of node id from the first entry. Table 15 show the results of experiments on loop detection. The execution time is the summation of the execution time required for model checking all the instances. The size of the state space and the amount of memory used are also the summation for all the instances. We created a total of 108 instances and of 648 instances of the new SPIN model with the loop detection code. For all these instances, the possibility of a loop occurrence was successfully detected by SPIN.
Related Work
SPIN model checker
SPIN is the most commonly used model checker. Model checking of AODV with SPIN is described in [6] , where model checking was used to show that a loop can be established in an older version of AODV. In [14] , De Renesse et al. describe their attempt to model check the WARP protocol. In their attempt, it is assumed that a network consists of five nodes and that the neighbor nodes of two of the five nodes are not changed. Model checking was used to check reachability of packets between two nodes by using supertrace/bitstate mode at runtime option with SPIN. In [36] , Wibling et al. apply SPIN and the UPPAAL model checker to the LUNAR protocol. When using SPIN they considered six different topologies and verified that a message from a source node reaches the destination node. Using UPPAAL, they considered eight topologies and verified the protocol against deadlock freedom, route establishment and message reachability. Câmara et al. proposed techniques to model protocol's behavior as two models [8, 9] : One model represents the internal behavior of a node which concerns processing of received packets, whereas the other model represents the external behavior model that concerns packet transfer between nodes. They showed that their modeling techniques were capable of detecting known defects of some MANET protocols, including LAR [27] , DREAM [5] and OLSR. In [35] , Steele et al. used to SPIN to verify OLSR against the property that a route exists for every destination node. Using SPIN they also showed some topologies where a node suffering from Byzantine failures cannot be detected.
UPPAAL model checker
UPPAAL is a popular model checker which has often been used for MANET verification. A distinguishing feature of UPPAAL is that it can verify real-time properties. In [10] , Chiyangwa et al. model checked AODV with UPPAAL. They showed that AODV with recommended timing parameter settings may result in a failure of route establishment and proposed how to solve this problem. In [37] , LUNAR was model checked against properties such as route establishment and message reachability. In [17, 15] , Fehnker et al. used model checking to demonstrate that the optimal route is not always established in AODV. In [23] and [12] , SMC-UPPAAL [13] , a statistical extension of the UPPAAL, was used for model checking of AODV and the DYMO protocol [34] .
Others
Process algebras have been used for modeling and verification of MANET protocols. In [38] , Zakiuddin et al. used CSP [22] to model CBRP (Cluster Based Routing Protocol) and verified the correctness with FDR [21] , a CSP model checker. Some process algebras for MANETs have been proposed in [38, 18, 30, 19, 20] . These algebras did not come with a model checker. Exceptionally in [24] , Höfner et al. used a process algebra called AWN [16] to model a protocol and model checked it by translating the model into UPPAAL.
A distinguishing work on MANET protocol verification is the one by Musuvathi et al. [31] , where CMC [31] , a model checker which works directly on C language source codes, was applied to three implementations of AODV, namely, AODV-UU [1] , kernel-AODV [2] and mad-hoc [3] . CMC detected several defects in these source codes.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed model checking techniques that can be used to verify a reactive MANET protocol, namely, AODV. In AODV or other reactive protocols, a source node retries the route establishing process some fixed number of times in face of failures. The proposed techniques allow verification of the whole series of trials only by model checking the last trial, thus resulting in state space reduction. We showed how the SPIN model checker can be used with our proposed technique. The results of experiments showed that the proposed techniques can significantly reduce time and space used in the model checking process and that this reduction may lead to an increase of the number of nodes that can be dealt with.
Also we demonstrated the model developed based on the proposed techniques is capable of finding a protocol design defect. In future, we plan to apply the proposed technique to other MANET protocols, including not only other reactive protocols but also multipath routing protocols. Although this paper only considered AODV, we believe that our approach can be extended to verify these protocols as they often share features in common with AODV. Such protocols include, for example, Multicast Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (MAODV).
Finally we make some remarks on other possible extension of the proposed approach. Although the focus of this paper was limited to route discovery, it should be worth verifying the behavior in other processes. For example, error handling, where rerr packets which were ignored in this paper are involved, is as important as route discovery; thus verification against its correctness deserves further study. Our interest in the paper was placed on reactive MANET protocols which rely on on-demand route discovery. As mentioned in the introduction, there is another type of protocols called proactive protocols which do not use on-demand route discovery but periodically update routing tables to maintain the network topology. Verification of this type of protocols should also be addressed. One possible direction of extending the proposed approach to address this problem is to apply it to verification of a starting phase where a node fulfills empty entries of the routing table by discovering routes to other nodes.
